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[Abstract] Recent insights on war economies have important implications for disarmament, demobili-
sation and reintegration (DDR). This paper identiﬁes an underlying dilemma of DDR: on the one hand, 
in order to convince warring factions to commit to peace, DDR strategies will have to offer signiﬁcant 
incentives that in turn may entrench the factions’ economic and political standing. On the other hand, 
offering the armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise post-war economic reconstruc-
tion, perpetuate cycles of underdevelopment and risk entrenching instability. It is argued in the paper 
that while more insights are needed on how DDR can be improved, it is equally important to go one 
step further and identify the positive as well as negative consequences for the economy, the market and 
the state when attempts at comprehensive disarmament and reintegration of combatants are undertaken. 
The paper discusses key ﬁndings from the literature on political economy of armed conﬂict and sug-
gests possible directions for new research.
Work undertaken for this paper was ﬁnanced by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The paper was presented at the Ministry’s seminar series on peace and reconciliation in December. 
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Introduction: economic implications of DDR 
Studies of civil wars have increasingly focused on the economic agendas of 
warring factions and the self-financing nature of intra-state warfare. Ac-
knowledging the economic dimensions of contemporary conflicts has serious 
implications for how we conceive of post-conflict strategies of disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).1 If combatants stand to benefit eco-
nomically from war, then a major challenge for peacemakers is to persuade 
fighters and commanders that peace will be equally advantageous. Strategies 
and initiatives undertaken under a DDR umbrella take on central importance 
in this regard: the design and scope of DDR will matter for whether fighters 
are persuaded to lay down their arms; DDR may affect the kind of transfor-
mation that might ensue with regard to the economic roles played by fighters 
and commanders; and policies adopted as part of reintegration packages may 
also have considerable consequences for state (re)building and how the mar-
ket economy functions in the post-conflict period. This is particular pertinent 
as the ‘R’ in DDR – reintegration – continues to grow in scope and impor-
tance within peacebuilding efforts.  
There is an underlying dilemma inherent in the above-mentioned chal-
lenges. On the one hand, in order to convince warring factions to commit to 
peace, DDR strategies will have to offer significant incentives that in turn 
may entrench the factions’ economic and political standing. On the other 
hand, offering the armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise 
post-war economic reconstruction, perpetuate cycles of under-development 
and risk entrenching instability.  
This working paper explores this dilemma by way of a selective literature 
review and indicating a preliminary agenda for research. Assessing the eco-
nomic implications of DDR is a timely endeavour. Strong consensus exists 
within the international community on the necessity of DDR in post-conflict 
phases.2 Given the centrality of DDR in post-war strategies and interven-
tions, it seems justified to do a stock-taking of these strategies and assess 
their implications for post-conflict economic recovery.  
                                                     
1 The UN Secretary-General’s Report (S/2000/101) ‘The Role of UN Peacekeeping in 
DDR’ defines DDR as follows: ‘Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light 
and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and can-
tonment of combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management 
programmes, including their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail 
their destruction. Demining may also be part of this process. Demobilisation refers to 
the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and 
combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of 
former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic 
needs; discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by 
recruitment into a new, unified military force. Reintegration refers to the process that 
allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to produc-
tive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind com-
pensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects.’  
2 Regarding the consensus on the necessity of DDR see for example Statement of Presi-
dent of the UN Security Council on ‘Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict 
peace-building’ (S/PRST)/1999/34) and UN Secretary General Report S/2000/101 ‘The 
Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR’. Among the many report and guidelines available 
are: ‘Securing Development: UNDP’s support for addressing small arms issues’ UNDP 
(BCPR) New York 2005.  
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The DDR gap in the literature on political economy of armed 
conflict  
There is a growing body of literature that deals critically with DDR, as well 
as various studies on the political economy of armed conflict. These studies 
form a central underpinning for this paper and the proposed research agenda 
to be presented here. Selected works will be discussed below, but before 
proceeding to that, I want to note one aspect that appears understudied in 
these two sets of literatures and that might benefit from further analysis. 
Academic assessments of DDR ask what happens to fighters and command-
ers when attempts these initiatives are undertaken. The central questions are 
often the following: are weapons collected and do the fighters reintegrate 
successfully into society? While this is indeed an important topic, equally 
significant is the following, slightly different perspective: what happens to 
the economy, the market and the state when attempts at comprehensive rein-
tegration of fighters and commanders are undertaken? What kind of trans-
formations, if any, unfold with regard to the economic role of fighters, 
fighter networks and top- and mid-level commanders in the course of DDR 
programmes? And what are the implications for the functioning of the mar-
ket economy and efforts at state building at the local and national levels?  
The second perspective constitutes a good starting point for formulating a 
new research agenda that may yield original and useful insights on both 
DDR and post-war economic development. Before spelling out in greater 
detail the key points of this research agenda, this paper first presents some 
central insights from recent studies of the political economy of armed con-
flict.  
Understanding civil wars  
Civil wars have, broadly put, been portrayed in three ways.3 Over-simplified, 
one perspective sees civil wars as a breakdown of normality and rationality, 
followed by purposeless cycles of violence (Kaplan 1994). A second per-
spective stresses the profound animosities among conflicting parties based 
on either ingrained hatreds, or political or social grievances on some or all 
parties to a conflict (e.g. Lund 1996). A third approach emphasises the eco-
nomic agenda, focusing on ‘greed’ and the economic incentives that warring 
parties have for initiating and continuing conflicts. This is an approach that 
argues against the notion that civil wars always centre on a contest between 
two sides trying to win: it holds that, rather than marking a breakdown, civil 
war can equally well be viewed as the creation of an alternative system of 
profit, power and protection (Keen 2000).  
An important starting point for studies on the political economy of armed 
conflict was the ‘greed and grievance’ dichotomy launched in debates over 
research findings by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002). From a wide-
ranging econometric survey of countries suffering instability, Collier and 
Hoeffler found a correlation between natural resource dependence and 
higher risk of conflict.4 Later studies have since modified these insights and 
                                                     
3 This draws on the outline given by Berdal and Keen (1997); see also Berdal and Malone 
(2000). 
4 See also Nitzschke and Studdard (2005), p. 223  
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indicated that while economic factors alone cannot fully explain the outbreak 
of conflict, economic dimensions do influence the onset, character and dura-
tion of conflict in important ways. (Nitzschke and Studdard 2005; Ballentine 
and Sherman, 2003: 1–13). Several major research initiatives on the political 
economy of armed conflict have been undertaken, including the International 
Peace Academy’s (IPA) three-year project on ‘ Economic Agendas in Civil 
Wars’, the UK based ‘Transformation of War Economies after Conflict’ led 
by Michael Pugh, and FAFO’s ‘Economies of conflict’. The insights of these 
and other research initiatives have been summarised in a number of publica-
tions.5 Some key findings relevant for this paper include:  
 
Regional dimension: Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper note in ‘War economies 
in a regional context’ that contemporary conflicts are often misleadingly la-
belled ‘internal’. Instead, civil wars are better understood as unfolding in the 
context of ‘regional conflict complexes’. Economic, military, political and 
social networks – often regional or even global in scope – take on important 
roles during conflict. The regional embeddedness of contemporary conflicts 
not only makes these areas vulnerable to insecurity ‘spillovers’ from 
neighbouring countries: illicit regional trading patterns or military or politi-
cal alliances across regions may contribute to perpetuating the conflict. In 
this perspective, border areas assume special importance. Border zones have 
in many regions been observed to be marginalised politically and economi-
cally – and as such seen as potential incubators of conflict (Studdard 2005). 
Moreover, as Studdard notes, ‘border areas are often where state authority 
and influence is most limited, and where informal networks may thrive on 
illicit economic activities and grow into spoilers for peace’ (ibid).  
 
State capacity: In countries where governments are facing losses in legiti-
macy and governing effectiveness, including in security provision, conflict 
may easily arise. Weak capacity may spur or re-ignite ethnic or communal 
animosity and trigger security dilemmas (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 9). 
There is an important economic dimension to this. As Ballentine points out: 
‘state weakness is a critical component of the opportunity structure that 
makes violent challenges militarily and economically feasible…where state 
weakness is associated with incomplete territorial reach and already large 
informal economies, the feasibility of launching and sustaining economies is 
enhanced because of the expanded access it affords income generating re-
sources and opportunities’ (ibid). This also has implications for how we con-
ceive of the link between natural resource dependence and war. As Ballen-
tine notes, this is not a direct relationship, but is mediated by the critical fail-
ure of economic resource governance.  
 
Crime: civil war may spur economic activities that will often be labelled ‘il-
legal’. Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, however, stress that in war-torn and 
post-conflict societies there is often a legal vacuum. This means that labels 
such as ‘criminal’, ‘illegal’ and ‘unofficial’ (implicitly in opposition to 
‘authorised’, ‘legal’ and ‘official’) may have limited descriptive and analyti-
                                                     
5 See in particular: Malone and Nitzschke (2005); Ballentine and Sherman (2003); 
Nitzschke and Studdard (2005); Studdard (2005). 
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cal value. They note: ‘in some cases so-called “illegal” economic activity is 
tolerated and even encouraged by officialdom, not only because it offers el-
ites opportunities for self-enrichment, but also because in conditions of 
chronic underdevelopment or conflict, it has positive social effects in ena-
bling people to cope along the margins of a dysfunctional formal econ-
omy’(Pugh et al. 2004: 8). Alternative labels such as ‘parallel’ economy also 
have major shortcomings.6  
Understanding war economies 
 The above discussion on crime points to the complexities of economic ac-
tivities unfolding as part of contemporary conflicts. David Keen was among 
the first to draw attention to this phenomenon by stressing that the calcula-
tions and behaviour of the parties to a conflict may give ‘rise to a particular 
war economy and a distinctive dynamic of conflict’ (in Berdal and Malone 
2000: 2). As to the economic underpinnings of war, he noted: 
 
Conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by re-
bels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members 
of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence 
to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to re-
sources. Under these circumstances, ending civil wars become difficult. 
Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may precisely be the le-
gitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punish-
able as crimes’ (Keen 1998: 6)  
 
The writings of Keen implied a radically new view on violence in contempo-
rary civil wars.7 Keen argues that at the local level there can be various eco-
nomic, security and psychological pay-offs for those who carry out acts of 
violence. War and violent activity may be profitable for a range of groups. It 
may be safer to be part of an armed group, than be counted among the vul-
nerable civilian population. In psychological terms, previous relationships of 
humiliation and dominance can be reversed, to the satisfaction of the execu-
tor of violence.  
These latter local-level acts point to the existence of both ‘top–down vio-
lence’ as well as ‘bottom–up violence’. Political leaders and entrepreneurs 
can mobilise violence on a large scale so as to become major elite actors in a 
conflict situation. However, violence may also ‘be actively embraced by or-
dinary people (either civilians or low ranking soldiers) as a solution to prob-
                                                     
6 This is a term often deployed on the shadow economies on the Balkans. Pugh et al. stress 
nevertheless that the term: ‘suggests economic activities and networks that run alongside, 
and are completely independent of state run economic activity. Instead there is often a 
symbiotic or parasitic relationship between the two – for example where state officials 
are actively involved in subverting state regulation or where state regulation creates in-
centives for unofficial trade’. (Ibid: 8)  
7 Keen stressed that one main function of violence is oriented towards changing (or retain-
ing) laws and administration procedures, including those related to the long-term distri-
bution of resources. An alternative function may be more geared towards circumnavigat-
ing the law – not so much changing it, as ignoring it. Incidents of this latter type include 
local and more immediate actions 
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lems of their own,’8 and these may at times combine with the top–down mo-
bilisation of violence.9  
These points have since been expanded upon by other writers who have 
further differentiated between types of war economies and the number of 
distinct actors participating in economic activities. One important differen-
tiation has been introduced by Jonathan Goodhand, who distinguishes 
among the ‘combat economy’, the ‘shadow economy’ and the ‘coping econ-
omy’ (Goodhand 2004). Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke have de-
signed a table (adapted from Goodhand’s outline) to illustrate these three 
aspects of war economies (see below).  
As is clear from Table 1, differentiating among the three types of war 
economies also makes it possible to recognise different types of actors. A 
combat economy may involve not only insurgents but also state agents, pri-
vate-sector actors, transnational criminal organisations and private security-
sector companies (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 11). Moreover, as was al-
luded to with Keen’s distinction between ‘bottom–up’ and ‘top–down’ vio-
lence, there are several sub-distinctions in relation to the category ‘combat-
ants’. Top leaders, mid-level commanders and fighters may have different 
motivations as well as roles in the war economy. Followers and supporters of 
armed groups, likewise, may differ from the combatants in their commitment 
to insurgency and ability to navigate in the war economy (ibid: 7–8).  
As can be seen from these brief remarks on the complexities of war 
economies and the various actors engaged, there are important implications 
for how we conceptualise the transformation from war to peace – and the 
transformation from a war economy to a peace economy. Playing on 
Clausewitz’ classic definition of war, Keen has suggested that war may in 
some ways be regarded as the pursuit of economics by other means (quoted 
in Berdal and Malone 2000). How should we then view the peace economies 
emerging after formal agreements to end hostilities: are they simply war 
economies pursued by other means? That is, do we find the same kind of 
economic activities and actors, only with different forms of threats of vio-
lence? And, if so, does this preclude post-war economic development and 
stability? What role do DDR initiatives play in these processes?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 quoted in Berdal and Malone (2000), p 25  
9 According to Keen, some of the concrete short-term economic functions of both top–down as 
well as bottom–up violence may be a war situation that ‘legitimates’ physical and economic 
abuses of particular civilian groups (and, in this way, wartime abuse is not a means for win-
ning the conflict but rather an end in itself); facilitation and opportunities for pillage; allows 
for demand of protection money for those spared from abuse; makes monopolisation of trade 
possible; facilitates exploitation of labour; changes terms for claiming land rights; allows for 
the extraction of aid; and institutionalises benefits accruing to the military. From Berdal and 
Malone (2000), p 31 .  
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Table 1: Economies, Actors, Motives and Activities during Armed Con-
flict10 
  
 The Combat Economy The Shadow 
Economy 
The Coping 
Economy 
Who? 
 
Key Actors 
Commanders, “conflict 
entrepreneurs”, fighters, 
suppliers of weapons and 
matériel  
Profiteers, 
transport sec-
tor, business-
men, drug traf-
fickers, “down-
stream” actors 
(truck drivers, 
poppy farmers) 
Poor families and 
communities 
Why? 
 
Motivations 
and Incentives 
for  
War and Peace 
To fund the war efforts or 
achieve military objec-
tives 
Peace may not be in their 
interest as it may lead to 
decreased power, status, 
and wealth 
Fighters may have an 
interest in peace if there 
are alternative sources of 
livelihoods available 
To make a 
profit on the 
margins of a 
conflict 
Peace could be 
in their interest 
if it encourages 
long-term in-
vestment and 
licit entrepre-
neurial activity 
Peace requires 
alternatives to 
the shadow 
economy; oth-
erwise a crimi-
nalised war 
economy will 
become a 
criminalised 
peace economy 
To cope and 
maintain asset 
bases through 
low-risk activi-
ties, or to survive 
through asset 
erosion 
Peace could en-
able families to 
move beyond 
subsistence 
How? 
 
Key Activities 
and  
Commodities 
Taxation of licit and illicit 
economic activities; 
money, arms, equipment, 
and mercenaries from 
external state and non-
state supporters;  
economic blockages of 
dissenting areas;  
asset stripping and loot-
ing; aid manipulation  
Smuggling of 
high-value 
commodities;  
mass extraction 
of natural re-
sources;  
control over 
currency order 
and exchange 
system; aid 
manipulation  
Employment of 
diverse liveli-
hood strategies to 
spread risk; sub-
sistence agricul-
ture; petty trade 
and small busi-
nesses; on-farm 
and off-farm 
wage labour; 
labour migration 
and remittances; 
redistribution 
through family 
networks; hu-
manitarian and 
rehabilitation 
assistance  
 
                                                     
10 From Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005) p 8; Ballentine and Sherman (2003).  
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DDR and transformations from war economies to peace 
economies  
Joanna Spear’s recent article ‘From political economies of war to political 
economies of peace: the contribution of DDR after wars of predation’ 
(2006), deals directly with some of these issues and highlights the important 
link to DDR. Spear discusses the traditional key components of disarma-
ment, demobilisation and reintegration strategies and explains how, in light 
of the new insights on war economies, these components could be fruitfully 
adjusted and expanded. A key argument of Spear is that the all three stages 
of DDR needs to better accommodate the different economic needs and chal-
lenges associated with the different categories of combatant: fighters, mid-
level commanders and top leaders. It is particularly important, for example, 
to address the needs of mid level commanders separately from fighters, since 
the former often have played central roles in the war economy, and are likely 
to continue their activities unless viable alternatives are provided for them. A 
central premise of Spear’s article is that DDR can be an important tool in 
jumpstarting a transition from war economy to peace economy – and indeed 
that the deepest possible entrance of former combatants into the ‘licit’ econ-
omy is desirable, provided that former combatants abandon their criminal 
activities. This is, however, as Spear also acknowledges, no easy task. There 
is also room, in my view, to problematise further the transformative vision 
that Spear puts forward. Is it really possible to accommodate fighters eco-
nomically and at the same time steer them into the ‘licit’ economy? And can 
this come about without any costs for existing actors in the ‘licit’ sphere or 
without impinging on how the ‘licit’ economy functions?  
The case of Tajikistan offers a highly interesting example in relation to 
these questions.  
Post-war Tajikistan: stability without development?11 
Nearly a decade after the formal end to fighting, Tajikistan now enjoys re-
markable levels of peace and stability – yet good governance and sustainable 
development have apparently not followed, and large-scale illegal drugs traf-
ficking is undermining the very foundations of the state. DDR programmes 
were central to the peace settlement, and they may be one of the possible 
variables that have been shaping Tajikistan’s distinct post-war economic and 
political trajectory. The comprehensive peace settlement called for tough 
compromises from the two main parties to the conflict. There was an empha-
sis on reintegration over and above demobilisation and disarmament. Entire 
units of anti-government forces were included into state military and police 
structures, while opposition leaders were given 30% of the top government 
posts. Given the full-scale integration of opposition units into the govern-
ment forces, demobilisation was in some ways partial. Fighters were dis-
armed to some degree, but large weapons stocks remained with command-
ers, and little pressure was levied on medium- and top-level leaders to sur-
render their weapons.  
During the Tajik civil war, many independent, yet locally entrenched, 
commanders were operating. Most of them committed to the peace agree-
                                                     
11 This section draws heavily on Torjesen and Macfarlane (forthcoming)  
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ment, and there were relatively few spoilers.12 This commitment can, argua-
bly, be explained by the intended and unintended consequences of the Tajik 
settlement, which gave the majority of commanders on both sides a signifi-
cant stake in the peace process. A central feature here was the large-scale 
integration of armed groups into the military and law-enforcement struc-
tures.13 The reintegration process was coupled with an initial ‘hands-off’ 
policy on the part of President Rakhmonov with regard to the commanders’ 
control of former opposition areas, (the Rasht and Tavildara Valleys and 
Gorno Badakhshan). Most of the police and law-enforcement structures in 
these areas were initially made up of opposition fighters and commanders, 
and there was little direct involvement or control from the central govern-
ment in local affairs.14  
The peace settlement, however, also entailed several other incentives. 
Most prominently, political and military leaders from both sides have ac-
quired flats, indeed whole blocks of flats, shopping centres, factories, cattle-
grazing areas as well as cotton fields and cotton-processing facilities. Most 
of the prominent political and military leaders from 1997 are now holders of 
major economic assets that were previously state property. The Tajik state 
had not embarked upon a large-scale privatisation process before fighting 
broke out in 1992, and there were no major formal initiatives of this kind 
during the civil war. This particular set-up meant that there existed a range 
of economically attractive state properties whose ownership could be trans-
ferred to the actors who had facilitated and accepted the peace process.  
Due to government connections and the continued command of fighters 
that guaranteed protection, the erstwhile military and political leaders were 
also favourably placed for initiating new and profitable economic activities 
in the post-war market economy. Former government commander Gaffur 
Mirzoev, for example, successfully established a major casino (‘Jomi Jam-
shed’) in Dushanbe, while one important civil war leader acquired control 
over the profitable import of wheat from Kazakhstan.  
Theses strategies were accompanied by the decision of President 
Rakhmonov not to prevent corrupt practices and/or the abuse of government 
positions for personal enrichment. Tajikistan has one of the lowest scores in 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (in 2006, ranked 
142 out of 163).15 There have been no lawsuits against corrupt individuals – 
the exceptions being former political or military leaders who have chal-
lenged Rakhmonov politically. In these cases, extensive and detailed com-
promising material has been presented, documenting deep-seated corrup-
                                                     
12 although indeed there were also some serious incidents of spoiler behaviour. See Torje-
sen and Macfarlane (forthcoming); see also Torjesen, Wille and Macfarlane (2005)  
13 Most military commanders of some standing were offered lucrative and high positions in 
the MVD, Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS), Min-
istry of State Security (MB) or State Committee on Border Protection (KOGG). In addi-
tion, in the years immediately following the peace settlement they continued to enjoy di-
rect control over potent fighting forces, since the combatants had followed the com-
manders into the new state structures. Arguably, this preserved trust while it also facili-
tated a commitment to uphold the peace agreement on the part of the commanders. 
14 Since 2001 and the consolidation of President Rakhmonov's power there has been exten-
siverotation of the police cadres; former government fighters or original MVD personnel 
from other areas are now serving in the former opposition areas. 
15 Transparency International 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index,http://www. transpar-
ency.org/ policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006 
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tion.16 The promotion of former military and political leaders into govern-
ment positions has, therefore, provided the dominant civil war actors with an 
easy means of enriching themselves, while also giving them a stake in the 
survival (if not the proper functioning) of government institutions.  
This deliberate and uneven neglect of corrupt practices is compounded by 
the drug trafficking through Tajikistan. In 2003, Tajikistan’s law enforce-
ment intercepted over five tons of heroin; small-scale drug couriers are regu-
larly arrested (ICG 2002).. And yet, there has not been any police campaign 
or court trials against the main organisers of the drugs trade in Tajikistan – 
except for allegations of drug dealing made during seemingly political trials 
against Rakhmonov’s opponents. During the war, the commanders financed 
weapons purchases through drugs trafficking (Literaturnaya Gazeta 1995). 
The dominant figures on both sides of the civil war were those best posi-
tioned to engage in drug trafficking after 1997. Some of these leaders sought 
to remain central figures in the drugs business, and President Rakhmonov 
has done little to hinder their activities.  
In the short and medium term, it is difficult not to deem Tajikistan and 
the policies of the Rakhmonov administration a success. Far less certain is 
what the long-term implications of Rakhmonov’s strategies will be. The case 
of Tajikistan highlights several questions which tend to arise in the wake of 
DDR processes: What are the development consequences of an entrench-
ment of the economic roles of civil war actors? Is there a point when ‘over-
facilitation’ of the interests of former combatants will jeopardise the overall 
economic well-being of the country and perpetuate cycles of underdevelop-
ment, grievance and insecurity? Tajikistan exemplifies these dilemmas. 
Nearly a decade after the signing of the peace agreement, it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that the state’s tacit acceptance of a wide of range of crimi-
nal activities may jeopardise the very foundations of the state and could dis-
tort the prospects for economic development. There is a potential for further 
and large-scale criminalisation of the Tajik state and society, as a result of 
the multi-billion dollar drug transit through the country. This may seriously 
affect economic and political developments, and could, in a worst-case sce-
nario, bring renewed cycles of instability to Tajikistan.  
Towards a research agenda on the political economy of DDR 
The case of Tajikistan and the preceding literature review point to several 
questions which could benefit from further assessment. The main issue in 
need of more research seems to be the following:  
 
? How do DDR processes impinge on the type of economic actors that 
emerge after the formal end to fighting, and what interplays typically 
occur between DDR processes and the activities of these actors in 
post-conflict settings?  
 
This overarching question touches on several research themes that in turn 
involve various sub-questions. Below are some preliminary suggestions.  
                                                     
16 See RFE/RL 2005a; also RFE/RL. 2003 and RFE/RL 2005b 
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Fighter networks in the post-war economy  
 
• Will the type of DDR approach (coercion vs. consent-based) influ-
ence what type of economic roles civil war actors may obtain in the 
post-conflict period?  
• How do armed actors respond to peace? Do they diversify their eco-
nomic, political and military networks? Are the links to mid-level 
and top commanders maintained?
17
 
• What impact do potential re-grouping and the loss of ties have on 
the ability of commanders to re-mobilise soldiers or use soldiers for 
civil economic (violent) purposes? 
• What implications do DDR processes have for the economic role 
played by female combatants and female camp followers in post-
conflict settings?  
Violence in the post-war economy  
 
• If, as is often the case, full disarmament has not been achieved, then 
does this have an impact of violence rates? Are there any links to ac-
tivities in the post-war economy? 
• Is there a transformation in the deployment of violence strategies in 
the post-war phase?  
• What is the effect of the interplay, if any, between top–down versus 
bottom–up perpetrators of violence when these attempt to transform 
into peacetime (and potentially violent) economic actors? 
Market economy in the post-conflict phase 
 
• Does the transformation of civil war actors into peacetime (and po-
tentially violent) economic actors spur distortions in the functioning 
of national, regional or local markets? If so, what are the develop-
mental and poverty-related effects of this?  
• Are there any links between DDR processes and potential transfor-
mation in border regions and cross border trade?  
• How does the presence of significant foreign deployments in coun-
tries like Afghanistan and Georgia affect local legal and illegal eco-
nomic activities? 
State consolidation, order and security 
 
• To what extent does the degree of commitment of security resources 
(provision of peacekeepers or scope of foreign military intervention) 
on the part of external agents (foreign governments, multilateral or-
ganisations) shape the conditions and opportunities that civil war ac-
                                                     
17 I am grateful to Michael Bhatia, University of Oxford and Brown University, for poin-
ting out this dimension to me.  
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tors have for gaining advantageous economic roles in post-conflict 
periods?  
• How does the emergence of private security providers hinder or 
benefit economic activities in post-conflict periods?  
• To what extent does integrating combatants into state security struc-
tures shape the state’s potential to play a constructive role in the 
post-conflict economic recovery process of the country?  
Conclusion  
 
The above questions represent a preliminary attempt at operationalising re-
search around the dilemma signalled in the introduction to this working pa-
per: in order to convince warring factions to commit to peace, DDR strate-
gies will have to offer significant incentives that in turn may entrench the 
factions’ economic and political standing. On the other hand, offering the 
armed factions important peacetime roles may jeopardise post-war economic 
reconstruction, perpetuate cycles of under-development and risk entrenching 
instability.  
Further research is needed on the consequences of the possible compro-
mises underpinning DDR efforts. While more insights are certainly also 
needed on improving DDR, it is equally important to go one step further and 
identify the positive as well as negative consequences for the economy, the 
market and the state when attempts at comprehensive disarmament and rein-
tegration of combatants are undertaken.  
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